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Article

Small Debts, Big Burdens
Chrystin Ondersma†
“Small debts are like small shot; they are rattling on every side, and
can scarcely be escaped without a wound . . . .”
– Samuel Johnson1

INTRODUCTION
For the impoverished, even relatively small amounts of debt
can be crippling.2 Individuals and families may be unable to
meet their basic needs as a result of servicing this debt. Without
savings, families must turn to credit to meet emergency expenses or to cover gaps in income, and such debt can quickly spiral. For example, a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau study
of vehicle title loans found that the median loan size was a little
under $700—but, with the average annual percentage rate
(APR) around 300%, many of the debtors were forced to take additional loans to repay the balance, with most taking out four or
more loans.3 For someone living on $1000 a month or less, a $700
debt can quickly spiral out of control. In addition to the financial

† Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. I thank Abbye Atkinson, Drew
Dawson, Pamela Foohey, Melissa Jacoby, Ted Janger, Dalié Jiménez, Robert
Lawless, Nathalie Martin, Gina Tron, Jay Westbrook, the National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges, and the Shuchman Fund of Rutgers Law School for financial support for data analysis, and my tremendous research assistants,
Reema Chandnani and Deepta Janardhan. Copyright © 2019 by Chrystin
Ondersma.
1. JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 208 (Roger Ingpen ed.,
1909) (1791).
2. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Debt, Poverty, and Personal “Financial Distress,” 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 493, 501 (2015).
3. CFPB, SINGLE-PAYMENT VEHICLE TITLE LENDING 12 (2016), http://files
.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201605_cfpb_single-payment-vehicle-title
-lending.pdf.
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burden of these debts, indebted individuals face the psychological toll of creditors’ persistent collection efforts.4
In some cases, individuals are even jailed or threatened with
jail time after bouncing a check or failing to appear at a court
proceeding related to a debt—even when the debt is disputed or
they did not know about the lawsuit.5 For example, a disabled
woman in Texas—whose only income was disability benefits—
was arrested for failure to appear in a case involving a $1500
loan for truck driving school that had ballooned to $13,000 over
the years with income and fees.6 Three U.S. marshals came to
her home while she was asleep, and after she dressed and put on
her prosthetic leg they shackled her feet and waist.7 In another
case, an elderly man in Pennsylvania was threatened with arrest
after a $10 check that his granddaughter had written bounced
due to insufficient funds resulting from an unexpected nursing
home charge.8 In a California case, an elderly woman with medical problems was threatened with jail if she did not pay charges
stemming from a $11.13 bounced check to a grocery store.9 She
was told she owed $262.95, including $125 for a “financial accountability class.”10
While even small debts can be particularly burdensome for
poor individuals and families, these debtors are the least likely
to have access to debt relief.11 If regulators will permit loans that
require all of a person’s disposable income to be diverted to service the debt, there must be a way to escape this debt. For some,
severe hardship may be ameliorated if debt can be swiftly targeted and eliminated early on, enabling them to return to
productivity and hopefully build at least a small safety net for
the next emergency.
It is unjust and nonsensical to require impoverished debtors
to undergo an expensive and burdensome process to obtain relief. This proposal is not about expanding entitlements to bank-

4. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 315–16 (2010).
5. ACLU, A POUND OF FLESH: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PRIVATE DEBT 4
(2018), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/022318
-debtreport_0.pdf.
6. Id. at 47.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 57.
9. Id. at 58.
10. Id.
11. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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ruptcy relief. Instead, this proposal is designed to make bankruptcy relief that is currently legally available, actually available to a subset of a group that currently faces great barriers to
access. Although improving access to debt relief for all poor debtors is urgent, particularly those with the largest debt loads, I
propose a fast-track debt relief process for debtors living at or
below the poverty line and owing less than $5000 in debt. Such
amounts are unlikely to harm creditors. Not only is the loss relatively small, but many of these debts may also have been ultimately uncollectable. While these debts can be crippling to the
impoverished, relieving such debts is unlikely to cripple creditors.
This proposal is only a partial solution, however. First,
credit will never be capable of solving chronic income shortfalls,
and debt relief cannot solve them either.12 However, at present
many impoverished individuals and families have no choice but
to turn to credit, particularly when faced with unexpected expenses or unexpected drops in income. Individuals are often
forced to choose between servicing their debt and meeting their
basic needs.13 It is crucial that speedy debt relief be available in
order to prevent a debt spiral. My proposal is also only a partial
solution because it only applies to debtors with relatively small
amounts of debt—even though it is clearly essential that bankruptcy relief also be accessible to impoverished individuals with
great debt loads. However, I do not believe it is currently politically feasible to fast-track all bankruptcies based on income
alone. This does not mean that things cannot be done to expand
access for this population; indeed, if the proposed system functions well perhaps a modified version of this system can be used
for poor debtors with larger debt loads.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I first discusses the
burdens of debt on the poor—even when debt loads are relatively
small. Then this Part explores whether and in what circumstances poor debtors can benefit from bankruptcy, and finally reviews the barriers to bankruptcy filing for poor debtors. Part II
proposes a fast-track debt relief process for debtors whose income is at or below the poverty line and who owe less than $5000
12. Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 65) (on file with author).
13. Cf. Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the
Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 239, 272 (2010)
(“[F ] inancially distressed families constantly make difficult choices about how
to juggle expenses.”).
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in debt. I argue that such a program would provide tremendous
relief for debtors without over-burdening creditors. I then discuss precisely how such a system could be implemented using
our existing bankruptcy system. Finally, Part III considers two
types of objections. First, the objection that such a system should
be administrative rather than part of the bankruptcy system.
And second, the objection that the proposal will distort both
lender and borrower behavior.
I. DEBT WITHOUT RELIEF
A. THE HEAVY BURDEN OF SMALL DEBTS ON THE POOR
Lower-income debtors have less debt than higher-income
debtors, but that debt represents a much larger share of their
income. The average credit card debt owed by someone who
makes $21,432 per year is $3611 in credit card debt, or 17% of
annual income.14 In addition, the average debt for individuals
whose debt has gone to collection is relatively low. On average,
individuals that have a debt in collections only owe around
$1300.15 For non-medical debt, the median is $366, and for medical debt, the median is $207.16 Only 2.8% of non-elderly individuals experienced family medical expenses over $10,000, and only
14% experienced medical expenses over $5000.17 However, 43%
experienced medical debt in excess of $2000.18 An estimated 77
million Americans—or 35% of adults—have at least one debt
that has gone to collection.19 One in five individuals have medical bills in collection.20
14. Erin El Issa, 2016 American Household Credit Card Debt Study, NERDWALLET n.14, https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/credit-card-debt/household
-credit-card-debt-study-2016 (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) (“We used consumer-reported data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and revolving credit card
balance data from Experian to estimate revolving debt based on household income. We used the estimated average credit card APR of 18.76% from our internal data to calculate the amount of interest each household would pay. Households that made less than $21,432 owed $3,611 in credit card debt and paid
annual interest of $677 on credit cards. Households that made more than
$157,479 owed $13,406 in credit card debt and paid annual interest of $2,515.”).
Meanwhile, the average debt for earners around $150,000 is just over $10,000,
but that represents just 7% of that household’s income. Id.
15. ACLU, supra note 5, at 9.
16. Id.
17. Melissa Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 307,
309–10 (2007).
18. Id. at 310.
19. ACLU, supra note 5, at 9.
20. Id.
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Although these amounts are relatively small, for individuals
living below the poverty line, small amounts of debt can cause
severe hardship. When income is not sufficient or hardly sufficient to meet basic needs, emergencies such as job loss, medical
expenses, car repairs, or other sudden costs or sudden drops in
income can cause individuals to become trapped in debt.21 Onethird of families have $0 in savings, and 41% of families report
that they would be unable to come up with $2000 to cover an
emergency expense.22 Seventeen percent of poor families spend
more than 40% of their family income on health care, while only
0.2% of families with incomes at or above 200% of the poverty
line spend over 40% of their income on health care.23 When individuals have no savings and nowhere to cut, they have no choice
but to turn to credit.24 However, when the loan comes due the
individual still does not have excess disposable income, so they
must cut on food, rent, or utilities in order to pay the bill. Meanwhile, interest accrues and it becomes less and less likely that
the individual will ever be able to get out from under the debt.
As Sara Greene explains in discussing her study of how lowincome debtors manage emergencies with debt, even when the
“initial shock was relatively small, the resulting cycle of debt,
interest, and fees became almost inescapable.”25 In some cases,
as discussed above, individuals may go without food, electricity,
or necessary medication in order to service debt.
These burdens fall hardest on Black and Latinx individuals,
who, as a result of persistent and systemic racist policies and
practices, are more than twice as likely to be poor than white
individuals.26 White households have thirteen times the median
wealth of Black households and ten times the median wealth of
Latinx households.27 Black and Latinx debtors are more likely to
21. Id. (“Many Americans spiral into indebtedness because they are living
in a state of financial peril and are pushed over the edge by a traumatic event
like the loss of a job, serious illness, or divorce, exacerbated by snowballing interest rates and fees.”); see also Sara Sternberg Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67
DUKE L.J. 233, 271–72 (2017) (including a sample of seventy-one low-income
individuals in North Carolina).
22. ACLU, supra note 5, at 9–10.
23. Jacoby, supra note 17, at 310.
24. See ACLU, supra note 5, at 10 (“56[%] of Americans say their incomes
are falling behind the cost of living.”).
25. Greene, supra note 21, at 291.
26. ACLU, supra note 5, at 10.
27. Id. (citing On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are
Worlds Apart, PEW RES. CTR. (June 27, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends/org/
2016/06/27/1-demographic-trends-and-economic-well-being/#fn-21776-11).
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be “targeted for risky financial products, such as payday loans,”28
and are less likely to have savings available to cover emergency
expenses.29 Controlling for income, there are twice as many debt
collection lawsuits in Black communities than in white communities.30
My empirical work with undocumented debtors provides additional evidence of the tremendous hardship that even small
loan amounts impose on the poor. I spoke with fifty-three undocumented individuals,31 and many of these individuals reported
feeling that their debts were too much to handle even though the
amounts borrowed were relatively small.32 Eighty-five percent of
the individuals I interviewed carried debt, and the majority had
borrowed from multiple lenders.33 Several borrowed from more
than two sources.34 However, despite these hardships and multiple borrowing sources, only four individuals owed more than
$5000.35 Four individuals owed between $2500 and $5000, five

28. Id. (citing FDIC, FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 83–84 (2014), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/

2013appendix.pdf ) .
29. See id. (explaining if “the bottom 25 percent of white households” liquidated all financial assets, they would have $3000 on average, whereas a full
quarter of “African-American families would have less than $5” after liquidating
assets (citing What Resources Do Families Have for Financial Emergencies?,
PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research
-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/11/emergency-savings-what-resources-do
-families-have-for-financial-emergencies)).
30. Id. at 11 (citing Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, The Color of Debt: How
Collection Suits Squeeze Black Neighborhoods, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://www.propublica.org/article/debt-collection-lawsuits-squeeze-black
-neighborhoods).
31. I describe the study in detail in my earlier paper, Debt Without Relief.
The design of the study was based on snowball sampling, a technique used to
reach sensitive populations. Chrystin Ondersma, Debt Without Relief: An Empirical Study of Undocumented Immigrants, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1801, 1808
(2017). In a snowball sample, initial interviews are conducted with individuals
based on a personal connection—in this case, a group of street vendors in New
York City—and are then invited to have their family and friends participate in
the study. Id. at 1809. The interview was conducted in two parts, and participants were paid fifty dollars for each part. Id. Interviews were conducted in
Spanish, recorded, transcribed, and translated. Id. The interview questions included demographic questions, questions about individuals’ financial situations,
questions about individuals’ borrowing experiences, and questions about individuals’ potential consideration of bankruptcy relief. Id.
32. Id. at 1830.
33. Id. at 1815.
34. Id. at 1816.
35. Id. at 1818.
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owed between $2000 and $2500, ten owed between $1000 and
$2000, and the rest owed less than $1000.36
Although the amounts of these debts are relatively low,
nearly a third of debtors always or often felt that their debts
were too much to handle.37 An additional 37% occasionally felt
that their debts were too much to handle.38 Fourteen debtors expressly discussed feeling overwhelmed by creditor calls.39 As I
report in my previous paper, study participants reported that
creditors would call repeatedly: “[E]veryday 2–3 times a day,”40
“when I am busy and at work,”41 just “calling and calling and
calling,”42 or “just to bother you for no reason and they keep calling you only to annoy you.”43 Others described creditors calling
to collect even after they had agreed to a negotiated payment
schedule: “The thing is they know the times that I’m supposed to
pay, since we had an agreement. They still keep calling you, they
harass but you already had an agreement.”44 Several study participants described the anxiety caused by the repeated calls:
“[W]hen they call repeatedly I get nervous, I feel like someone’s
going to choke me,”45 and the repeated calling “stresses me out
and put[s] me in a bad mood.”46
Although some of the debt incurred may have been incurred
due to chronic income shortfall, for many of these individuals,
debt was incurred in the wake of severe hardship.47 Thirty-nine
individuals (75%) had experienced an unexpected hardship such
as job loss, divorce, death of spouse, eviction or foreclosure, hospitalization, deportation proceedings, or arrest.48 Twenty-nine
participants (over half of participants) experienced more than
one of these hardships.49 This suggests that a substantial portion
of the debt was incurred as a result of a sudden expense or sudden drop in income.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 1830.
Id.
Id.
See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0001).
See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0004).
See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0009).
See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0003).
See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0012).
See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0030).
See id. (referencing Interview with Respondent 0048).
Id. at 1811.
Id.
Id.
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These debt burdens can have extremely dire consequences.
In addition to harassing creditor calls, threats of garnishment,
repossession, and foreclosure, in many instances debtors are
even threatened with arrest, and in fact jailed, in cases stemming from small amounts of private debt.50 If a debtor does not
appear in court to contest a debt, the court can issue a default
judgment.51 Individuals may miss court dates because they were
not served, were confused by the notice, were unable to leave
work, unable to find childcare, or were unable to attend for medical reasons.52 After the judgment is issued, the debtor may be
summoned to appear in court to address the payment of the judgment, and/or to fill out paperwork providing information about
their financial assets.53 In forty-four states, courts are able to
“issue warrants for the arrest of debtors who” do not comply.54
Every year tens of thousands of arrest warrants are issued that
stem from a failure to pay a private debt.55 The ACLU was able
to obtain data on arrest warrants issued in debt collection proceedings from three states and four counties, and found that in
these counties more than 8500 arrest warrants were issued in
2016 pursuant to debt collection proceedings.56 In many of these
cases the debts are small: the ACLU documented hundreds of
cases where individuals were arrested for medical debts of less
than $1000.57 Arrest warrants can result even when the
amounts of debt at issue are miniscule—even amounts under
$10.58 In twenty-four of the twenty-seven case studies the ACLU
reported, the original debt at issue resulting in jail or threat of

50. See ACLU, supra note 5, at 27 (noting cases where threatening letters
were sent for checks that bounced for as low as two dollars).
51. Id. at 22 (citing FTC, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 7 (2010), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission
-bureau-consumer-protection-staff-report-repairing-broken-system-protecting/
debtcollectionreport.pdf).
52. Id. at 22.
53. Id. at 13.
54. Id. at 12.
55. Id. at 4.
56. See id. at 12 (stating this information was obtained by the ACLU
through the Freedom of Information Act and open records requests).
57. See id. at 45 (noting the hundreds of cases in Maryland).
58. See id. at 7 (stating that the ACLU documented thousands of cases
where consumers were threatened with jail for bounced checks under ten dollars).
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jail was less than $5000, and in at least ten of these cases the
amount of the original debt was less than $1000.59
Many of these cases are manifestly unjust. The cases mentioned in the introduction are just a few of numerous horrifying
examples. Other examples include a single mother in Nebraska
who was arrested in front of her children and jailed for failure to
appear on a case stemming from a $176.50 medical bill,60 a man
in Utah who committed suicide after being jailed for failing to
appear on a case stemming from a $2000 ambulance ride
charge,61 and a man in Indiana who was placed under arrest in
front of his four young kids, then brought to jail where he spent
two nights after being strip-searched—the case stemmed from a
$4024.88 auto loan deficiency, where the car had already been
repossessed and the man was not aware that he had been sued.62
Some debtors who are unable to pay debts stemming from
bad checks are also threatened with jail by virtue of agreements
between prosecutor’s offices and collection agencies, whereby
debt collection agencies are permitted to use the prosecutor’s
seal on the demand letter.63 The individual is informed that failure to pay the debt—not just the initial debt, but a variety of fees
imposed by the collection agency, which sometimes more than
quadruple the initial charge—is a crime and that non-payment
can result in jail.64 The fees include, for example, a $150–200
charge to attend a mandatory financial responsibility class—provided, of course, by the debt collector itself.65 Again, the initial
debt can be miniscule: one lawyer in Washington state documented over 10,000 cases where a check written for under $10
resulted in letters threatening arrest and prosecution.66 In
Washington, a mother of three received such a letter bearing the
seal of the Kitsap County prosecutor’s office and informing her
that she faced criminal charges if she did not pay $41.19 plus
over $200 in fees, all stemming from a $41.19 check to Goodwill
for the purchase of clothes for her children.67 An individual in
59. See generally id. at 45–46 (outlining the ACLU’s case studies).
60. Id. at 45.
61. Id. at 46.
62. Id. at 55.
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 7; see also id. at 4–5 (discussing an initial $2500 student loan that
mushroomed into $12,000 with interest and fees).
65. Id. at 7.
66. See id. (citing Interview by ACLU with Paul Arons, Lawyer, Law Office
of Paul Arons (Apr. 12, 2017)).
67. Id. at 27 (referencing Cavnar v. BounceBack, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-235
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Los Angeles was threatened with criminal prosecution after
bouncing a $3.87 check to Ralphs grocery store—she ultimately
paid $444.87 to the debt collector, including $150 in diversion
class fees and $225 in missed class fees.68 The elderly man in
Pennsylvania who bounced a $10 check for medicine, and the elderly woman in California who bounced an $11.13 for groceries,
were also sent letters threatening arrest and listing hundreds of
dollars of charges because of this kickback arrangement.69
Even where no arrest happens, threats of imprisonment
may scare individuals to going without crucial basic needs, including food and medication, in order to pay the debt—even
when the debt is not actually owed.70 For example, one seventyfive-year-old woman living on social security was frightened into
paying the charges for fear of jail—but in order to pay the debt,
she went without her medications.71 A woman in Georgia was
frightened into paying a $800 debt her daughter allegedly owed;
she borrowed money to make part of the payments, and stopped
paying her utilities, resulting in her power being shut off.72 The
ACLU reported that, in many of the cases they reviewed, “debtors took out high-interest payday loans, borrowed from friends
or relatives, surrendered public benefits, or went without food or
medication to avoid the threat of jail.”73 In addition, although
income from social security or disability is exempt from collection, threats from debt collectors can cause individuals to give
up this income in order to satisfy debts.74
The experience of being jailed and arrested can cause severe
psychological trauma.75 Individuals arrested under contempt orders stemming from debt reported a number of medical problems, including “anxiety, [insomnia,] stomach problems, panic
attacks . . . inability to travel” or to remain home alone, and
worsening of conditions such as Crohn’s disease.76 In a Maryland
-RMP, 2015 WL 4429095 (E.D. Wash. July 17, 2015)).
68. Id. at 28.
69. Id. at 58 (referencing Smith v. Levine Leichtman Capital Partners, Inc.,
723 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2015)).
70. Id. at 7.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 35 (referencing Gibson v. Rosenthal, Stein, & Assocs., No. 1:12
-cv-2900-WSD, 2013 WL 8367255 (N.D. Ga. July 3, 2013)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 35–36.
75. See id. at 19 (noting instances of parents being arrested in front of their
children and the corresponding emotional distress).
76. Id. at 20.
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case, an elderly married couple (ages seventy-eight and eightythree) were each jailed for failing to appear in a case involving
$2342.76 that they owed to their homeowner’s association.77 The
couple was never even served.78
While in jail, the husband “began vomiting blood and became non-responsive,” and had to be transferred for emergency
treatment.79
If the debtor has young children, the trauma is magnified.
In one Pennsylvania case, a mother was arrested while her minor son slept, and the police refused to allow her to wake him
and explain what was happening.80 In another incident in Ohio,
a woman was placed under arrest while home with her threeweek-old infant.81 In Georgia, a woman was arrested in front of
her five-year-old after police were called during a family argument and found an outstanding warrant on a default judgment
from unpaid rent—the woman had no idea that her landlord had
sued because she had never been served.82 In Washington, an
individual was arrested while at home with his six-year-old disabled son—he was kept in the police car for over an hour, “watching in horror as his son sobbed and ran, scared and confused, in
and out of their home.”83 All this because the father missed a
hearing about the deficiency amount he owed on his pickup truck
after it had been repossessed.84
In some cases, individuals have been fired for missing work
as a result of being jailed; for example, an Illinois truck driver
was fired for missing six days of work while jailed, and an Indiana woman was fired after being arrested while at work.85 Even
if the debtor does not end up spending time in jail, the issuance
of an arrest warrant alone may appear on a background check,
putting in peril job, housing, and educational opportunities.86

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 6.
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B. THE BENEFITS OF BANKRUPTCY FOR POOR INDIVIDUALS WITH
RELATIVELY SMALL DEBT BURDENS
There are clearly risks associated with even small amounts
of debt. In an ideal world, it would not be necessary for poor individuals to turn to credit to meet their basic needs. As Abbye
Atkinson points out in her forthcoming article, Rethinking
Credit as Social Provision, credit is not an appropriate solution
to poverty.87 She points out that credit can only be helpful if the
future version of the debtor is likely to have a higher income—if
not, credit cannot provide assistance, because the future self will
never have additional income with which to repay the debt, and
will be required to forego essentials if the debt is to be repaid.88
Unfortunately, at present it does not seem likely that a more
robust welfare system is imminently forthcoming. As I discuss
in my article, A Human Rights Framework for Debt Relief, I argue that if a government is unwilling to ensure access to basic
needs (including housing, water, health care, and food), and
debtors will thus be required to incur debt in order to cover their
basic needs—particularly if an emergency arises—a robust and
accessible debt relief system is crucial.89
Of course, bankruptcy is not the only road to debt relief: federal and state legislatures could severely curtail debt collection
if they so choose. Some have suggested radical solutions such as
prohibiting courts’ involvement in any debt collection below a
certain amount.90 Dalié Jiménez has suggested a complete ban
on any collection activity after the statute of limitations has expired.91 A far more robust Fair Debt Collections Act and other
state debt collection reforms could also ameliorate the burden of
debt collection activity on impoverished debtors. Finally, at a
minimum, arrest or threats of arrest could be severely curtailed
or prohibited altogether; indeed, some states already wholly ban
arrest related to the non-payment of debt.92 The ACLU Report

87. Atkinson, supra note 12, at 6–7.
88. Id.
89. Chrystin Ondersma, A Human Rights Framework for Debt Relief, 36 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 269, 338–39 (2014).
90. See, e.g., DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE 296 (1974).
91. Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41,
78 (2015).
92. ACLU, supra note 5, at 6 (explaining that in forty-four states judges can
issue arrest warrants for failure to appear at post-judgment proceedings); Note,
State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV.
1024, 1037–38 nn.116–20 (2016).
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also includes a number of excellent proposals to prevent individuals from being jailed or threatened with jail as a result of inability to pay private debts.93 Although each of these proposals
would relieve the burden for low-income debtors, none offers a
completely clean slate for over-indebted individuals. Many debtors have debt from multiple sources, and could benefit from a
solution that would resolve all of their debts at once and offer
them a fresh start completely free of their debts.
Can bankruptcy be part of this solution, even if the debt burden is relatively small? There are not many existing filers with
small amounts of debt: In 2007, the 25th percentile with respect
to the amount of unsecured debt was $18,351, and the 25th percentile with respect to the amount of total debt was $38,425.94
The median debt load was $87,261, and the median unsecured
debt load was $33,882.95 In their 2010 study of chapter 7 bankruptcies, Katherine Porter and Deborah Thorne explain that
debtors in the sample had a median income of $21,870 and a median unsecured debt load of $27,573.96 In an additional study by
Katherine Porter and Deborah Thorne in 2017, the median unsecured debt in chapter 13 bankruptcies was $ 23,440.97 Data
suggest that fewer than 2% of debtors currently in the bankruptcy system owe $5000 or less.98 But you would not expect filers with debt burdens of $5000 or less to seek bankruptcy relief
under the current system; the complexity and expense are disproportionate to the relief. Naturally, debtors that do not file for
bankruptcy have much lower debt loads—the median unsecured
debt was $7000 in 2011.99 That does not mean, however, that all
those with lower debt burdens are unburdened by their debt obligations.
93. See ACLU, supra note 5, at 7, 40–43.
94. John A. E. Pottow et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical
Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 404 (2008).
95. Id.
96. Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh
Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 82 (2006).
97. Sara S. Greene et al., Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1049 (2017).
98. E-mail from Robert M. Lawless, Professor, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, to
author (Oct. 23, 2018) (on file with author) (reporting Stata calculations based
on data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project). In 2007, only 11 of 2384 debtors in the 2007 sample owed less than $5000; in the current Consumer Bankruptcy Project, only 10 of 513 debtors owe less than $5000. Id.
99. MARINA VORNOVYTSKYY ET AL., CENSUS, HOUSEHOLD DEBT IN THE
U.S.: 2000 TO 2011, at tbl.A1, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/
library/working-papers/2011/demo/debt-highlights-2011.pdf.
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Bankruptcy can indeed be extremely valuable even for debtors with relatively low debt burdens. First, bankruptcy ceases
creditor collection activities, including harassing creditor phone
calls,100 repossession, foreclosure or eviction actions,101 and collection law suits—including arrest warrants stemming from
such cases.102 Second, bankruptcy allows debtors to keep the
fruits of their labor going forward rather than requiring everincreasing portions of debtors’ funds to be diverted to creditors
perpetually.103
1. Ceasing Collection Actions
Filing for bankruptcy would put an immediate end to all collection proceedings, including civil contempt proceedings. Bankruptcy filing also puts an end to creditor collection calls. One of
the most commonly listed reasons for seeking bankruptcy relief
is the desire to halt threatening creditor phone calls.104 One in
four individuals contacted by debt collection agencies described
feeling threatened.105 Additionally, when I interviewed low-income undocumented debtors for a previous project, many reported feeling burdened or harassed by creditor calls.106 It is often not feasible for debtors to simply ignore the calls. The calls
take a tremendous psychological toll.107 Even if lenders would
not actually take the action they threaten, “[f]ew [debtors] know
the law well enough to understand that the threats are
empty . . . .”108 A bankruptcy filing puts an immediate stop to
creditor calls, relieving debtors from burdensome and harassing
phone calls.109
Bankruptcy also puts a stop to garnishment, repossession,
eviction, and foreclosure actions. Although low-income debtors
may not have many assets, this does not mean that creditors
100. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
101. Id. (providing for a stay of all collection actions and a stay of continuation of any judicial process).
102. Id.; In re Daniels, 316 B.R. 342, 347–48 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2004).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (enjoining collection of any discharged debts).
104. See, e.g., Mann & Porter, supra note 4, at 314–15.
105. ACLU, supra note 5, at 32 (citing CFPB, CONSUMER EXPERIENCES WITH
DEBT COLLECTION: FINDINGS FROM THE CFPB’S SURVEY OF CONSUMER VIEWS ON DEBT (2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/
201701_cfpb_Debt-Collection-Survey-Report.pdf ) .
106. Ondersma, supra note 31, at 1830.
107. Id.
108. Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Saul Schwartz, Bankruptcy for the Poor?, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 471, 477 (2007).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
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cannot interfere with their property. Creditors may go after
debtors’ wages via garnishment orders or seek to repossess debtors’ goods.110 For example, if they own a car—even if they have
no equity in the car and it is thus not an “asset”—and they fall
behind on payments, a creditor may repossess it. Low-income individuals often do not have enough savings on hand to purchase
large household items, such as mattresses, sofas, refrigerators,
and stoves. As a result, low-income debtors may purchase these
items on credit, or under a rent-to-own model, and these items
may be repossessed if the debtor misses payments.111 When a
debtor files for bankruptcy, creditors cannot repossess property
without the court’s permission.112 While this does not guarantee
that the debtor will be able to keep the property, it provides some
breathing room for the debtor to negotiate with creditors or identify an alternative means of keeping that property or acquiring
an equivalent. For example, debtors in chapter 7 can “redeem”
property by paying only what the property is worth rather than
the total owed. If friends or family give or lend the needed funds
the debtor can keep the property.113
Bankruptcy filing can also prevent evictions or foreclosures.
Again, bankruptcy does not guarantee that debtors will be able
to retain their home or apartment, but it temporarily halts such
proceedings and gives debtors a chance to catch up on arrears.114
In addition, many bankruptcy courts have loss mitigation programs that provide for mortgage renegotiation during the bankruptcy process.115 These remedies will not work in all cases—for
example, landlords with prepetition judgments are now permitted to evict the debtor unless the debtor is able to cure the default

110. Ware, supra note 2, at 504.
111. Creola Johnson, Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need
a Bed and a Car, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1221, 1250, 1254 (2000) (explaining that
rent-to-own contracts are often used for furniture (38.9%), appliances (23.4%),
or televisions (11.9%), and that “20% of rent-to-own customers are on public
assistance”); Angela Littwin, Testing the Substitution Hypothesis: Would Credit
Card Regulations Force Low-Income Borrowers into Less Desirable Lending Alternatives?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 403, 436–37 (2009).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (providing that a stay can be lifted if a creditor is not
adequately protected or there is no equity in the property and it is not necessary
for the debtor’s effective reorganization).
113. Id. § 722.
114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
115. See General Order, In re Adoption of Loss Mitigation Program Procedures, No. M-364 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/m364.pdf.
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within thirty days of filing.116 However, for debtors that experience a temporary loss in income or increase in expenses and are
able to resume payments, bankruptcy can spare individuals and
family disruptions in housing.
Finally, bankruptcy stops collection lawsuits.117 In addition,
all procedures and processes related to the collection suit are
barred. This means that an arrest warrant cannot be issued for
failure to respond to requests for financial information or failure
to appear in court, and the debtor cannot be arrested.118 The
ACLU reported an instance where a man was able to avoid arrest after missing a hearing on an unpaid mortgage deficiency
only after filing for bankruptcy.119 Although criminal proceedings (including some bad check proceedings) may be exempted
from the automatic stay, this is not the case if the purpose of the
proceeding is to compel payment of debt.120
My empirical work with low-income undocumented debtors
also supports the conclusion that bankruptcy could be beneficial
for low-income debtors. Twenty-one (39.6%) debtors I spoke with
expressed wanting calls from creditors to end, fifteen debtors
(28.3%) indicated that they would not like to have to repay

116. Andrew P. MacArthur, Pay to Play: The Poor’s Problems in the
BAPCPA, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 407, 441 (2009) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)(22)).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
118. Id.; In re Daniels, 316 B.R. 342, 345 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2004) (concluding
that creditor and counsel willfully and recklessly violated the automatic stay in
pursuing arrest of debtor on contempt of court charge for failure to turn over
financial information after debtor filed bankruptcy). The Bankruptcy Court
stated, “[w]hen Debtor filed for bankruptcy relief, any further proceedings in
the state court action were unconditionally stayed by operation of federal law.
That would obviously include any efforts to enforce the state court’s arrest warrant.” Id. at 348.
119. ACLU, supra note 5, at 49.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)–(b); In re Daniels, 316 B.R. at 350. Unfortunately,
the protection of the automatic stay does not guarantee that creditors will not
attempt to violate the automatic stay. In one Minnesota case, a man was jailed
for six days in solitary confinement on a warrant obtained by a debt collector,
even though he had filed for bankruptcy. ACLU, supra note 5, at 20. He was
denied access to a phone and thus could not contact his attorney. Id. Still, the
penalties for willful violations of the automatic stay are very steep, so creditors
should be deterred from such violations after being notified that the debtor has
filed for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (stipulating that individuals injured
by violations of the automatic stay are entitled to “recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages”); In re Daniels, 316 B.R. at 357 (awarding debtor $135
in lost wages, $2850 in attorneys’ fees, and $1350 in punitive damages).
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money owed, ten (18.9%) indicated that they wanted to avoid repossession of personal property, and eleven (20.8%) indicated
that they would like to stop a foreclosure or eviction.121
2. The Fresh Start
A key reason to seek the formal discharge of debts is to ensure that, going forward, one can retain the fruits of one’s labor
without seeing them diverted to repaying creditors. Even debtors with no valuable personal property may experience wage garnishment that makes it impossible for them to pay all necessary
expenses. One of the main benefits of bankruptcy filing is the
immediate cessation of any wage garnishment.122 Debtors can
also, in some circumstances, recover garnishments made within
ninety days prior to the bankruptcy filing.123 (As Nathalie Martin has pointed out, the garnishments are only recoverable if
they are not “de minimus”—that is, if they exceeded $600,124 although such amounts are hardly “de minimus” from the perspective of an impoverished debtor.) Low-income debtors may also
struggle to build wealth if their wages are subject to garnishment. Debtors with incomes at or near the poverty line may not
be subject to garnishment.125 Some states may provide citizens
with higher minimum wage standards than federal standards.126
However, according to a study conducted by the National Consumer Law Center, “no state provides adequate legal protections

121. Ondersma, supra note 31, at 1830.
122. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
123. Id. § 547(b) (showing how payments within ninety days before filing
may be recovered if they will enable the debtor to receive more than they would
have received absent the payments in a liquidation). Although this provision is
designed to bring the funds back into the estate to distribute amongst all creditors, the debtor may be entitled to them if they have sufficient exemptions
available. Id. § 522(g).
124. Id. § 547(c)(8); see Nathalie Martin, Poverty, Culture and the Bankruptcy Code: Narratives from the Money Law Clinic, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 203,
231–32 (2005).
125. Ware, supra note 2, at 503–04.
126. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 246, § 28 (2012); Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T
LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2019);
Minimum Wage Laws in the States, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/
minwage/america.htm (last updated Jan. 1, 2019).
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to prevent garnishment and property seizures from driving families into poverty.”127 More than half of U.S. states permit garnishment of one-fourth of debtors’ paychecks—and have “no
limit on garnishment” if the check “is deposited in their bank
account.”128 In addition, even in states that provide protections
for individuals living below the poverty line, if a debtor’s income
rises above the poverty line, garnishments will be reinstated.129
Thus, although garnishment laws provide some protection for
those individuals suffering the most financially, they do not help
those living just above the poverty line. While these debtors may
only have a small proportion of their wages garnished, any
amount being garnished is likely detrimental when a debtor is
already making so little. In addition, debtors protected from garnishment because they earn too little may be deterred from earning more because they could then be subject to garnishment.
After the debtor achieves a discharge in bankruptcy proceedings, creditors are precluded from collecting on any debt incurred prior to the bankruptcy filing.130 Absent a formal discharge of debts, the outstanding debts are always “waiting for
the person should he or she ever find a way out of poverty and
thus lose judgment-proof status.”131
In states that permit arrest warrants to issue for failure to
appear in post-judgment proceedings, a fresh start is particularly crucial. Individuals may have no idea that a default judgment has been entered against them, may have no idea that a
warrant is outstanding, or may live in fear of being arrested. In
one case in Perry County, Indiana, an individual was told they
must pay $25 a month toward a $1865.93 judgment for an eightyear-old unpaid rent debt; when the individual explained he
could only afford $5 a month, he was told he would be arrested
if he did not pay.132 In one 2015 case in the Southern District of
127. ACLU, supra note 5, at 23 (citing NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., NO
FRESH START: HOW STATES LET DEBT COLLECTORS PUSH FAMILIES INTO POVERTY (2013), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-no-fresh
-start.pdf ) .
128. Id. at 23 n.112 (citing Paul Kiel, Unseen Toll: Wages of Millions Seized
to Pay Past Debts, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/
article/unseen-toll-wages-of-millions-seized-to-pay-past-debts).
129. See Handling a Wage Garnishment or Third Party Citation, ILAO (Aug.
2017), https://www.illinoislegalaid.org/legal-information/handling-wage
-garnishment-or-third-party-citation.
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2012) (enjoining collection of any discharged
debts).
131. Ben-Ishai & Schwartz, supra note 108, at 477.
132. ACLU, supra note 5, at 17.
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Texas, a man was arrested in his home for failure to appear in a
case involving his nonpayment of student loans from 1983.133
Although originally just $2500, the payments had swelled to
$12,000.134 The individual lived on social security and disability
and lacked sufficient disposable income to make payments toward the debt.135 When he missed a court date—because he had
just come out of open-heart surgery—several U.S. Marshals appeared at his home and arrested him.136 In Nebraska, a woman
living on exempt social security and disability income was jailed
on a 15-year-old arrest warrant.137 The warrant stemmed from
failure to appear on a case involving $1800 allegedly owed to a
construction company for home repairs.138
In addition to the financial benefit of discharge, a formal
declaration of discharge can offer emotional or psychological benefits as well; some have posited that the bankruptcy discharge
“liberates the bankrupt psychologically.”139 Others have posited
that debtors benefit from the process of appearing before a tribunal to obtain an official, legal declaration that their debt is
discharged because it helps them move forward.140
Relief from even small amount of debts can have tremendous impact on poor families. An Urban Institute study found
that families with even modest savings—between $250 and
$749—are more able to withstand income disruptions or sudden
expenses than families with no savings.141 Their risk of eviction
or missing utilities payments is substantially lower than families with no savings.142 This suggests that where individuals are
able to discharge small amounts of debt they can avoid getting

133. Id. at 5.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 52.
138. Id.
139. Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1061 (1987); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and
the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 785–86 (1983).
140. See Pamela Foohey, A New Deal for Debtors: Providing Procedural Justice in Consumer Bankruptcy 19–20 (Feb. 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
141. SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN ET AL., URBAN INST., THRIVING RESIDENTS,
THRIVING CITIES: FAMILY FINANCIAL SECURITY MATTERS FOR CITIES 3 (2016),
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/thriving-residents-thriving-cities
-family-financial-security-matters-cities.
142. Id. at 4.
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caught in a debt spiral—instead of devoting ever increasing portions of their income to servicing debt, these individuals can pay
for cars, homes, food, and other economy-fueling goods and services. In addition, they can meet their own basic needs, making
it less likely that these individuals and families will need to rely
on government aid to get by.
Bankruptcy cannot offer a perfect “fresh start” in all cases—
if the individual constantly experiences income shortfalls, bankruptcy cannot eliminate them. In addition, as Katherine Porter
and Deborah Thorne have found, steady income is essential to
debtor rehabilitation and many debtors who obtain bankruptcy
relief still struggle to pay bills one year after filing.143 Still, in
many cases the debt was incurred during a particular period of
crisis: “The most common use of the discharged debt has been to
provide income and medical care during times of personal economic crises, such as job loss, illness, or divorce.”144 Particularly
since the massive shrinking of the social safety net from 14.2
million welfare recipients in 1994 to 2.7 million in 2016,145 individuals have been largely forced to turn to credit when income
shortfalls hit.146 For these debtors, eliminating the debt before it
spirals to consume ever-increasing portions of their income is
critical. In particular, eliminating debts incurred in times of
hardship could enable impoverished individuals to better meet
their basic needs. Again, bankruptcy will certainly not help
every low-income individual, and it is not a solution to poverty.
However, particularly for individuals with debts incurred during
a temporary crisis, debt relief may be essential.
C. BARRIERS TO BANKRUPTCY FOR POOR DEBTORS
While bankruptcy can indeed be beneficial for poor debtors,
it is incredibly difficult for poor debtors to successfully access
bankruptcy relief. It is now well documented that the poorest
143. Porter & Thorne, supra note 96, at 83–85 (reporting empirical evidence
that one-quarter of debtors experienced difficulty paying routine bills one year
after discharge).
144. Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1933, 1943–44 (2011).
145. Greene, supra note 21, at 236–37 (citing Caseload Data 1994 (AFDC
Total), OFF. FAM. ASSISTANCE (Dec. 19, 2004), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/
resource/caseload-data-afdc-1994-total; TANF Caseload Data 2016, OFF. FAM.
ASSISTANCE (Jan. 12, 2016), https://acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/tanf-caseload-data
-2016).
146. Atkinson, supra note 12, at 18–19; Chrystin Ondersma, A Human
Rights Approach to Consumer Credit, 90 TUL. L. REV. 373, 379 (2015).
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debtors are the least likely to successfully access bankruptcy relief.147 After the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (BAPCPA), bankruptcy became even more complex and expensive, and thus more inaccessible for the poorest debtors.148 In
addition, even if poor debtors are able to file, they are less likely
to be able to afford attorneys, and, as discussed below, studies
have shown that pro se cases are less likely to result in discharge
of debt.149
The total fees required to file for bankruptcy in 2018 were
$335 to file under chapter 7 and $310 to file under chapter 13.150
These were substantial increases from the time when BAPCPA
was enacted in 2005, at which point filing fees were $200 for
chapter 7 and $150 for chapter 13.151 The Bankruptcy Code permits low-income individuals to apply for a waiver of the filing
fee.152 To be eligible for a fee waiver, individuals must have incomes less than 150% of the poverty line and must be unable to
pay the fee in installments.153 Many poor debtors file for fee
waivers. According to a 2007 study, 71.2% of pro se filers (whose
income is significantly lower than non-pro-se filers) filed for a fee

147. See Ben-Ishai & Schwartz, supra note 108, at 487–89 (demonstrating
that merely waiving filing fees is insufficient to increase bankruptcy filings
given high legal costs); Littwin, supra note 144, at 1937 (citing procedural complexity as one cause of increased legal costs, resulting in poor debtors delaying
or foregoing bankruptcy); Mann & Porter, supra note 3, at 290 (“[M]ost families
in serious financial distress do not file for bankruptcy.”); id. at 324 (“[D]ebtors
may defer their filings for additional time because they must save up to pay
higher attorney’s fees . . . .”). See generally MacArthur, supra note 116, at 440–
75 (detailing the struggle of poor debtors to access bankruptcy relief as a result
of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act).
148. See MacArthur, supra note 116, at 440–75.
149. See Ben-Ishai & Schwartz, supra note 108, at 487–89.
150. Schedule of Bankruptcy Fees, U.S. BANKR. CT. S. DISTRICT IND. (Sept.
1, 2018), http://www.insb.uscourts.gov/webforms/newlaw/FeeSchedule.pdf.
151. MacArthur, supra note 116, at 439.
152. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 418, 119 Stat. 109 (2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1930(f ) (1)–(3) (2012)); see also U.S. COURTS, OFFICIAL FORM 103B: APPLICATION TO HAVE THE CHAPTER 7 FILING FEE WAIVED (2015) [hereinafter OFFICIAL
FORM 103B], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b103b.pdf.
153. § 418, 119 Stat. 109.
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waiver.154 The fee waiver forms, however, are relatively complex.155 Debtors must calculate and report their monthly disposable income and prove that they are unable to pay the sum in
installments.156 This complexity may deter some debtors from
even attempting it, but it is impossible to know how many debtors do not file because they cannot afford the filing fee or because
they are intimidated by the fee waiver form.
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code added a
number of procedural and technical hurdles to bankruptcy relief
that made the process both more complex and more expensive.
Debtors must obtain credit counseling before filing157 and file a
credit counseling certificate with the petition,158 they must file
documents showing all money obtained within sixty days before
the filing,159 they must file their income tax returns,160 and they
must complete and file a monthly net income statement.161 Debtors seeking discharge under chapter 7 must complete the confusing “Statement of Current Monthly Income and Means Test Calculation” to prove that they are eligible for chapter 7 filing.162
Failure to complete and file all of these items within forty-five
days of filing the petition results in automatic dismissal of the
debtor’s bankruptcy case.163
When I teach consumer bankruptcy in my class, I ask the
students to fill out a Chapter 7 Means Test Calculation Form for
a relatively simple bankruptcy.164 In eight years of teaching, only
two students have succeeded in filling out the form successfully.
About half of the class makes an error at the beginning of the
154. Littwin, supra note 144, at 1965 (“Data from the 2007 [Consumer Bankruptcy Project] show that unrepresented debtors had significantly lower incomes [than represented debtors] at the time of bankruptcy.”); Philip Tedesco,
In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 92 fig.4 (2010).
155. See OFFICIAL FORM 103B, supra note 152.
156. Id.; MacArthur, supra note 116, at 419.
157. MacArthur, supra note 116, at 425; see 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 521(b)(1).
159. Id. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv).
160. Id. § 521(e)(2)(A).
161. Id. § 521(a)(1)(B)(v).
162. MacArthur, supra note 116, at 419; see U.S. COURTS, OFFICIAL FORM
122A-1: CHAPTER 7 STATEMENT OF YOUR CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME (2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b122A-1.pdf; U.S. COURTS, OFFICIAL FORM 122A-2: CHAPTER 7 MEANS TEST CALCULATION (2016) [hereinafter
OFFICIAL FORM 122A-2], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b_
122a-2.pdf; see also 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(v).
163. 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2).
164. See OFFICIAL FORM 122A-2, supra note 162.
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form because they select the wrong “number of people used in
determining deductions [] from income” under Part 2, question
5.165 The form states: “Fill in the number of people who could be
claimed as exemptions on your federal income tax return, plus
the number of any additional dependents whom you support.
This number may be different from the number of people in your
household.”166 Many students thought that only children are
claimed as exemptions and did not include the debtor or debtor’s
spouse. Next, virtually all students make mistakes when trying
to ascertain the proper local or national standard in a given category. They have trouble figuring out what should be included in
a mortgage or rent operating expense versus a mortgage expense, and they have trouble understanding question 9, which
instructs debtors to enter zero if the debt payment exceeds the
local mortgage expense standard.167 The transportation expense
section is even more difficult for them, as they struggle to understand what is included in operating costs and what is included
in ownership costs.168 These problems persist even though the
students are aware of and access the tables provided on the Department of Justice’s website. Without the link to those tables,
the errors and confusion, already severe, would be magnified tremendously.
Although purportedly designed to keep out high-income
debtors, the effect of the 2005 amendments has been to reduce
access for the poorest debtors who cannot afford the increased
fees and who have difficulty navigating the complex technical
rules without attorneys.169 Ironically, the elements of the Code
165. Id. at 2.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 3.
168. See id.
169. See David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 228 (2007) (“If BAPCPA has
an impact, it is by requiring more paperwork of consumer debtors, thereby driving up the cost of going bankrupt.”); Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White,
Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 665, 668 (2005) (“[The means test] adds complexity and cost to all
cases, and may deter or dismiss relatively few would-be chapter 7 debtors.”);
Littwin, supra note 144, at 1936 (“At least one scholar has persuasively argued
that a decline in overall accessibility was, in fact, the point [of BAPCPA].”);
Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 395 (2007) (“As filing costs rise, even the most desperately insolvent must delay bankruptcy, at least until they can save the amount
necessary for the filing fee and the attorney’s fee.”); cf. Isabel V. Sawhill, Poverty
in America, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 405, 407–08 (David
R. Henderson ed., 2008).
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that can benefit the few wealthy or high-income debtors that
seek its relief are unaltered. Generous homestead exemptions in
some states,170 exclusions of spendthrift trusts from the bankruptcy estate,171 and the absence of caps on secured debt payments when calculating disposable income172 all work to ensure
that the strategic high-income, wealthy debtor can indeed access
bankruptcy relief.173 While burdensome for all debtors, poor
debtors are less likely to be able to manage time away from work
to complete all of the required paperwork and locate all of the
documents (such as tax returns and pay stubs) that are required
to be submitted.174 Additionally, the poor are less likely to have
single, stable sources of income, which makes tracking down all
required documents more complicated as they must locate income records associated with each temporary or part time job.
The counseling requirement is also problematic. First, most
counseling services have a fee that averages about $50, which
very poor debtors likely cannot afford.175 Second, poor debtors
may not be able to afford time away from work to complete the
counseling.176 Third, debtors attempting to navigate the system
without an attorney—as poor debtors are more likely to be stuck
doing—may simply be unaware of the counseling requirement.177 Even where debtors urgently need bankruptcy relief,
courts are bound to dismiss cases where the debtors failed to obtain a counseling certificate before filing.178
In addition to making bankruptcy filing much more complex, BAPCPA also caused attorney’s fees to increase.179 This
170. See Lawrence R. Ahern, III, Homestead and Other Exemptions Under
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: Observation on
“Asset Protection” After 2005, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 585, 594 (2005).
171. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2012).
172. See Culhane & White, supra note 169, at 676 (suggesting that unlimited
secured debt may contribute to bankruptcy abuse).
173. See Carlson, supra note 169, at 227 (“[T]he 2005 means test encourages
bankruptcy abuse [and is] more generous to high-income debtors than the old
case law.”).
174. MacArthur, supra note 116, at 420 (“The poor may not have the time
away from work to complete the required documents . . . .”).
175. Id. at 425 (citing Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy
Reform: The Need for Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295,
1311 (2006)).
176. Id. at 420.
177. Id. at 430.
178. See In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 115 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005); MacArthur,
supra note 116, at 429–30.
179. Littwin, supra note 144, at 1960 (referring to a study which found that
chapter 7 attorney’s fees “increased by 51[%] between early 2005 and 2007”).
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could be due partly to the increased complexity and partly to the
additional liability imposed on debtors’ attorneys, including liability even for technical errors in the debtors’ schedules of assets
and liabilities.180 Attorney’s fees increased 51% after the 2005
amendments went into effect, from a mean of $712 in early 2005
to a mean of $1078 in 2007.181 Before BAPCPA went into effect,
fees ranged from $1500 to $3000 with a median of $2000.182 In
February 2008, fees ranged from $1800 to $4000 with a median
of $3000.183
Some debtors living at or below the poverty line are able to
obtain the counsel of pro bono or nonprofit bankruptcy attorneys
who provide free or low-cost assistance, but the need for these
services far outstrips demand. Between 2001 and 2007, the percentage of pro se debtors in chapter 7 rose by 250%, suggesting
that debtors could not afford the higher attorney’s fees.184 At the
same time, the percentage of pro se debtors that succeeded in
obtaining a discharge significantly dropped, suggesting that the
added complexity for bankruptcy filings after BAPCPA contributed to fewer successful filings.185 One study of pro se debtors in
five districts found no dismissals of chapter 7 pro se cases in
2001.186 In 2007, by contrast, 17.6% of pro se chapter 7 bankruptcies failed.187 Almost all of these dismissals were due to technical
deficiencies, such as incomplete tax records, errors in forms, or
missed deadlines.188 These debtors were also much less likely
than represented debtors to successfully correct these technical

180. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4) (2012); see also Catherine E. Vance & Corinne
Cooper, Nine Traps and One Slap: Attorney Liability Under the New Bankruptcy
Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 283, 286–88 (2005) (describing BAPCPA’s “provisions
directed at attorneys who represent consumer debtors in [c]hapter 7 cases”).
181. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-697, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: DOLLAR COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 22 (2008).
182. Id. at 25.
183. Id. at 25–26; see also Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee
Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 30 (2012) (showing a fiftyone percent increase in total direct access costs in chapter 7 no-access cases after
BAPCPA and a thirty-seven percent increase in total access costs in chapter 7
asset cases).
184. Littwin, supra note 144, at 1956, 1960 (analyzing data from five districts and found a 2% pro se rate in the 2001 sample and 5.3% pro se rate in the
2007 sample).
185. Id. at 1957.
186. Id. at 1971.
187. Id. at 1971–72.
188. Id. at 1976–77 (citing Consumer Bankruptcy Project data).

2236

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2211

deficiencies and continue with their cases.189 As Angela Littwin
explained, “pro se [c]hapter 7 debtors after BAPCPA encountered disentitlement through procedural hurdles twice: first in
the form of unaffordable attorneys and, second, more directly
through technical requirements they could not meet on their
own.”190 Nathalie Martin explained, “Having read many pro se
petitions, I am convinced that the vast majority of pro se debtors
have no idea how to fill out the paperwork.”191 Martin further
explains that many debtors list all of their assets and do not
claim any exemptions, thus risking loss of important resources.192
Some debtors without the resources to pay for attorneys use
petition preparers, who assist with preparation of the petition
without providing legal advice.193 Petitioner preparers are not
permitted to give legal advice; their role is limited to typing
forms.194 The results for debtors using petition preparers are
somewhat better than the results for debtors filling out the forms
without any assistance.195 The fee for petition preparation
should not exceed $200.196 However, debtors living at or below
the poverty line are unlikely to have access to $200 for petition
preparation.
Another possible risk for low-income debtors is that they will
end up filing a “no money down” bankruptcy, whereby they pay
attorneys over time in a chapter 13.197 In a chapter 13, debtors
repay creditors over a period of three to five years, and only receive a discharge at the end of the case.198 If they miss a payment
189. Id. at 1977.
190. Id. at 1957.
191. Martin, supra note 124, at 233 (emphasis omitted).
192. Id. at 233 n.105.
193. Michael D. Sousa, Legitimizing Bankruptcy Petition Preparers: A Sociolegal Prescription for Change, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269, 273–74 (2015). Sousa
suggests that in simple, “no asset” cases, petition preparers should be allowed
to give limited legal advice and accompany and aid debtors in their section 341
meetings with creditors. Id. at 275–76, 311.
194. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER GUIDELINES
paras. 1, 10 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ust-regions/
legacy/2014/03/10/bpp_guidelines.pdf.
195. Littwin, supra note 144, at 1965.
196. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 194, para. 4 (“The charge typically
allowed in this district for a bankruptcy petition preparer’s services is no more
than $200 . . . .”).
197. Pamela Foohey et al., “No Money Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
1055, 1059 (2017).
198. Jean Braucher et al., Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy Chapter
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and their case is dismissed, the debtor again owes all of this debt
with interest and does not receive any relief. Unfortunately,
most debtors do not have success in a chapter 13—only around a
third of such debtors ultimately receive a discharge in bankruptcy.199 By contrast, 95% of debtors in chapter 7 receive a discharge.200
Filing a chapter 13 may not represent a debtor’s choice of
filing at all: studies show that certain districts have much higher
rates of chapter 13 filings than others,201 and that Black debtors
are more likely to end up in chapter 13.202 The cause of this disparity has proven to be due to bias—attorneys disproportionately steer Black debtors into chapter 13 cases—even when they
express a preference for filing a chapter 7.203 As discussed above,
filing a chapter 7 petition without an attorney can be risky, as
17% of chapter 7 filings are dismissed.204 A debtor who feels unable to navigate chapter 7 pro se may select a “no money down”
chapter 13 instead—not realizing that the risk of failure and
non-relief is much greater.205
All of the available evidence suggests that bankruptcy relief
is out of reach for the vast majority of impoverished debtors. The
increased complexity of the bankruptcy process after BAPCPA
has only exacerbated this problem. Debtors living at or below the
Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 394 (2012) (outlining the characteristics of chapter 13 filings).
199. See Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of
Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 107 (2011); accord Greene et al.,
supra note 97, at 1042 (finding that only 36.5% of a sample of 2007 chapter 13
cases resulted in discharge).
200. See Porter, supra note 199, at 107.
201. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One
Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 556–61 (1993) (finding the “local
legal culture” has an impact on the number of chapter 13 filings); see also Chrystin Ondersma, Are Debtors Rational Actors? An Experiment, 13 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 279, 308–12 (2009) (discussing evidence that demonstrates local legal
players influence chapter 13 filing patterns).
202. See Braucher et al., supra note 198, at 393–95 (finding that African
Americans disproportionately file chapter 13 bankruptcy partly because consumer bankruptcy lawyers appear to be guiding them into this option).
203. Id. at 411–13.
204. Littwin, supra note 144, at 1971–72 (stating that, in 2007, 17.6% of unrepresented debtors had their chapter 7 filings dismissed or converted).
205. Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, How the Bankruptcy System Is Failing
Black Americans, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2017), https://features.propublica.org/
bankruptcy-inequality/bankruptcy-failing-black-americans-debt-chapter-13
(“And once [black debtors] chose Chapter 13, we found, the odds of their cases
ending in dismissal—with no relief from their debts—were about 50 percent
higher.”).
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poverty line can seldom afford counsel, and, without counsel, are
not able to navigate the complex filing requirements and fulfill
all of the necessary prerequisites for obtaining a discharge in
bankruptcy. These burdens are even more severe for Black debtors, who are not only more likely to be living below the poverty
line, but are also more likely to be pressured to file a chapter 13,
under which they are unlikely to ever see their debt discharged.206 Data suggest that around 13% of debtors in the bankruptcy system have income at or below the federal census bureau
poverty line.207 Given the barriers to filing discussed here, there
are likely many more impoverished debtors who need bankruptcy and who are unable to access bankruptcy.208
II. FAST-TRACK DEBT RELIEF OPTION: A PARTIAL
SOLUTION
Given that impoverished individuals experience substantial
hardship when incurring even small amounts of debt, I propose
a fast-track debt relief option for individuals with incomes at or
below the poverty line who owe less than $5000 in debt. This
Part offers two alternative proposals, which I will call Proposal
A and Proposal B. I will first describe the proposals in detail and
then will discuss the benefits of the proposals. These proposals
are meant to compliment rather than supplant proposals that
focus on providing access to financial aid to cover emergencies.
Until we have a functioning safety net to help low-income individuals facing sudden expenses or sudden drops in income, we
must have a way for them to easily discharge such debt before it
consumes all available income and interferes with their ability
to pay for necessities such as food and utilities.

206. See Foohey et al., supra note 197, at 1060 (“African Americans are more
likely to file ‘no money down’ chapter 13 cases than other similarly situated
debtors.”); see also supra notes 202 and 205 and accompanying text.
207. See E-mail from Robert M. Lawless, supra note 98. Of 2335 debtors in
the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 14.9% of debtors had incomes below
the census bureau poverty line based on their household size; of 2952 debtors in
the current Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 12.36% of debtors in the study had
incomes below the census bureau poverty line for their household size. Id.
208. MacArthur, supra note 116, at 410 n.18 (“Ninety percent of bankruptcy
debtors have incomes below the national median, and a third of the bankruptcy
debtors have incomes below the poverty level.” (quoting Ralph Brubaker & Kenneth N. Klee, Resolved: The 1978 Bankruptcy Code Has Been a Success, 12 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 273, 286 (2004))).

2019]

SMALL DEBTS, BIG BURDENS

2239

A. PROPOSAL A
Any individual who has an income less than or equal to the
poverty level income for his or her state should be able to easily
obtain a discharge of $5000 or less in debt. This proposal is designed to avoid the risk of a debt spiral and to achieve a greater
likelihood that these individuals will continue to be able to meet
their basic needs. Currently, the system is too complex and expensive, and such complexity and expense is particularly unjustified in situations where small amounts of debt are owed by impoverished individuals. There is no meaningful recovery for
creditors in such cases, yet the burden on these debtors is tremendous.
Under my proposal, an individual seeking discharge of
$5000 in debt or less may, if their income is at or below the poverty line, obtain a discharge of this debt under chapter 7 by filing
a special one-page petition under penalty of perjury. The primary goal of this proposal is to make it at least as easy for impoverished debtors to file and obtain a discharge as it was for
such filers prior to the implementation of BAPCPA. This should
not be controversial since BAPCPA was purportedly designed to
exclude only high income, “can pay” debtors from debt relief.209
In addition, the amount to be relieved under this fast-track option is only $5000, so it does not represent a grave economic loss
or risk for creditors.
Rather than listing all assets, petitioners would sign an affidavit that they have no non-exempt assets. Again, if the judge
or trustee wishes to require further information they may do so,
but it is a waste of time and resources in most cases, as the vast
majority of such debtors have no non-exempt assets. (I will address risks and moral hazard concerns in the next section.)
Procedurally, creditors receive notice of the petition and will
have thirty days to object to the granting of the petition. Because
these are no-asset cases and the debt amounts are so small, § 341
meetings will not be automatic but instead will take place only
upon request by the creditor, judge, or trustee within thirty days
of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. If there is no request for
a meeting within thirty days, the judge will grant a discharge.
There will be no other requirements for these debtors: no counseling requirement, no requirement that the debtor submit pay
stubs and tax returns, no requirement that the debtor submit

209. See MacArthur, supra note 116, at 413–14.
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statements of intention with respect to property, and no requirement that the debtor undergo any means testing. When only
small amounts of debt are at issue, the barriers created by these
requirements are simply disproportionate to any possible benefit. These hurdles are justified, if at all, only for debtors with
reasonable incomes who are seeking to discharge large amounts
of debt.
Rather than re-drafting each section and subsection to clarify that these certain requirements to do not apply where the
debtor’s income is at or below the poverty line and seeks discharge of $5000 in debt or less, Congress can amend the Code to
add an additional simple, concise subsection:
Special Petition
Individuals may file a special petition if:
(a) The debtor’s current monthly income is at or below the poverty line
for the state in which the debtor resides,
(b) The debtor seeks to discharge not more than $5,000; and
(c) The debtor has no non-exempt assets.

If, after thirty days, no creditor has objected to the Special Petition, the Court shall grant a discharge of no more than $5,000 in
debt. Debtors seeking relief pursuant to the Special Petition do
not need to complete creditor counseling and do not need to submit any other documents or filings; §§ 109(h), 521(a)(1)(B),
521(b), 521(e), and 521(i) shall not apply. The court or trustee
may request a hearing to determine whether the debtor is eligible for the Special Petition. If the debtor is ineligible for the Special Petition, the debtor may file a traditional chapter 7 petition
without any prejudice and without any limitations to the automatic stay.
This special fast-track petition would be free. Because petitioners are already attesting that their income is at or below the
poverty line, no separate fee waiver form is necessary. The application for fast-track bankruptcy will have included a statement of current monthly income, an affidavit indicating that the
debtor has no or nominal non-exempt assets, and an affidavit
indicating that the debtor owes no more than $5000. The debtor
can submit a list of creditors as in § 521(a)(1)(A), but the additional documentation required in § 521(a)(1)(B) will not be required. A schedule of assets and liabilities under
§ 521(a)(1)(B)(ii), a statement of financial affairs under
§ 521(a)(1)(B)(iii), copies of pay stubs under § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv), a
statement of monthly net income under § 521(a)(1)(B)(v), and a
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statement disclosing anticipated increase in income under
§ 521(a)(1)(B)(vi) need not be filed.
The debtor will also not be required to file the materials contemplated in § 521(b). There will be no counseling requirement
under § 109, and thus no need to file a certificate under § 521(b).
The debtor will also not be required to submit tax returns under
§ 521(e). Of course, § 521(i), which provides for automatic dismissal if this information is not submitted within forty-five days,
also will not apply.
It is important to note that trustees or bankruptcy judges
would be able to request additional documents if there is some
doubt or uncertainty about the debt or income threshold. In addition, debtors are still subject to a denial of discharge in the
event that they provide inaccurate information; for example, if
they knowingly misstated their income or debt level in applying.
Section 727(a)(4) permits denial of discharge if “the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case—(A)
made a false oath or account; (B) presented or used a false
claim . . . (D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to
possession under this title, any recorded information . . . .”210
The difference is that these materials would not need to be submitted as a matter of course.
A schedule of assets and liabilities is not necessary in these
cases, as only no-asset cases are eligible, and as creditors will be
notified and must in any event file claims under § 501. If the
debtor misstates the amount of debt on the bankruptcy petition,
the debtor will not be entitled to fast-track bankruptcy. In no
event would the debtor be able to discharge more than $5000 of
debt using the fast-track process. Additionally, if the debtor owes
more than $5000 they will not be able to access the fast-track
system, even if they only want to discharge $5000 worth of their
debt. Debtors with greater debt burdens should seek relief of all
of their debt via the regular chapter 7 filing process; making the
fast-track accessible to this high-debt debtors runs the risk of
debtors being pressured (by creditors, attorneys, or trustees) into
accepting less relief than that to which they are entitled.
Assembling these materials is too onerous, complex, and
time-consuming than is justified given the poverty of the debtors
and the small amount of debt at issue in these fast-track cases.
Because debtors receiving relief under the Special Petition are

210. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A)–(B), (D) (2012).
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only discharging $5000, the eight-year bar under § 727(a)(8)211
in place for traditional bankruptcies is arguably too onerous. I
propose a four-year refilling bar for Special Petition cases. Lowincome debtors cannot be expected to get through eight years
without a financial crisis that necessitates turning to credit—
indeed, even four years is arguably too long. Ideally this proposal
would accompany other policy changes that would make reasonable credit accessible to low-income debtors. For unsecured debt
alone the median amount discharged is over $25,000, so even if
a debtor files four special petitions over the course of sixteen
years, this will represent less than the median debt discharged
in a traditional chapter 7. Even if the debtor files for a traditional
chapter 7 after four years, this additional $5000 discharged four
years prior would not represent substantially greater losses for
creditors relative to the amount discharged by the average
debtor.212 Hence, permitting debtors to access the bankruptcy
system again after four years as opposed to eight would not be
costlier to creditors than a traditional bankruptcy filing.
B. PROPOSAL B
Because legislative change is cumbersome, fraught, and infinitesimally likely to succeed, another option, which may come
close to achieving the same goal, is a rule change. 11 U.S.C.
§ 521(a)(1)(B) does not require the filing of these items in all circumstances—it requires them “unless the court orders otherwise.”213 Thus, there is nothing preventing the bankruptcy
courts from ordering that these materials are not required in certain cases. Thus, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4002(b),
Individual Debtor’s Duty to Provide Documentation,214 could be
amended to provide that debtors with income below the poverty
level are not required to file the materials indicated in
§ 521(a)(1)(B). In such cases, courts would submit a form order
waiving these requirements, similar to orders waiving the bankruptcy-filing fee.
For increased simplicity, the fee waiver and documentation
waiver could be condensed. If a debtor provides sufficient documentation for a filing fee waiver, this would also suffice for a
court order that documentation required by § 521(a)(1)(B) is not
211. Id. § 727(a)(8) (providing that debtors granted a discharge within the
previous eight years are not eligible for a discharge).
212. Porter & Thorne, supra note 96, at 82.
213. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B).
214. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4002(b).
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required. Under this approach, if a debtor files a successful fee
waiver using Official Form B 3B,215 the court would file an order
that the fee waiver request is granted and that the debtor need
not file the documentation contemplated in § 521(a)(1)(B). Because the fee waiver form itself is somewhat cumbersome (and
only debtors with incomes less than 150% of the poverty level are
eligible for fee waiver),216 line two of the form could include a
space where the debtor can enter the poverty level for the state
in which the debtor resides.217 Because debtors may not know
how to look up the poverty levels in their state, this line should
include a link to the U.S. trustee website with a table providing
the poverty levels in each state. If the amount entered in “your
family’s average monthly net income” is equal to or less than the
amount indicated in the following line, providing for the poverty
level in the debtor’s state, the debtor would not have to complete
the remainder of the form.218 A line would be added to the form
indicating, “Debtor qualifies for a fee waiver and for a waiver of
the § 521(a)(1)(B) documentation requirements.” The corresponding court order would indicate that the fee waiver application has been granted and that the debtor is not required to submit the documentation contemplated by § 521(a)(1)(B). Thus,
because § 521(a)(1)(B) already provides that the documentation
need not be filed if the court orders otherwise,219 the debtor can
avoid these onerous filing requirements consistent with the
Bankruptcy Code.
There are two benefits to Proposal B. First and foremost, it
does not require legislative action. Second, it would not require
a limit of $5000 in debt—because the Code already provides that
debtors need not file these documents if the court so orders,220
there is no reason that a debt maximum need be imposed. This
proposal does not relieve the debtor from all of the onerous requirements, including 11 U.S.C. § 109,221 but it would make the
process substantially more feasible for many debtors.

215. U.S. COURTS, OFFICIAL FORM B 3B: APPLICATION TO HAVE THE CHAP7 FILING FEE WAIVED (2014) [hereinafter OFFICIAL FORM B 3B], https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/b_3b_0.pdf.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f ) (1) (2012).
217. OFFICIAL FORM B 3B, supra note 215, at 1.
218. Id.
219. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B) (2012).
220. Id.
221. Id. § 109.
TER

2244

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2211

1. Justifying the Proposal
This proposed fast-track petition can help low-income, no asset debtors to avoid debt traps and succeed in meeting their basic
needs. Again, these proposals are not the only measures needed
to address the problem of financing small financial shocks, or of
facilitating bankruptcy filing. In addition to the proposals for
limiting debt collection mentioned above, there are also proposals designed to more directly help low-income debtors meet
their needs. For example, Jacob Hacker proposes an insurancebased plan to finance dramatic drops in income.222 His proposal,
however, would only be triggered by 20% declines in income,223
and would not solve the problem of smaller financial shocks,
such as car repairs or less drastic medical emergencies. Abbye
Atkinson, among others, has discussed the need for a more robust social safety net.224 Other proposals are at least partially
credit-based. For example, Mehrsa Baradaran has proposed
postal banking as an option for small loans to finance emergencies with reasonable terms, which would help individuals to
avoid debt spirals.225 Sara Greene proposes a Financial Services
for Family Security organization modeled on the Money Advice
and Budgeting Service, a program in Ireland that helps individuals who are struggling with debt.226 Greene’s program would
also provide small no-interest loans to cover emergencies, after
meeting with a counselor to discuss the need for the loan.227
There are also other important bankruptcy specific proposals. Dalié Jiménez, Lois Lupica, and Jim Greiner have suggested access to clear self-help materials that would enable debtors to successfully file for themselves.228 Deborah Thorne, Robert
Lawless, and Pamela Foohey, have suggested allowing debtors
to pay attorneys’ fees in installments in chapter 7 cases so that
debtors do not have to file under chapter 13 in order to pay for

222. JACOB S. HACKER, BROOKINGS INST., UNIVERSAL INSURANCE: ENHANCECONOMIC SECURITY TO PROMOTE OPPORTUNITY 2 (2006), https://www
.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/200609hacker.pdf.
223. Id.
224. See Atkinson, supra note 12, at 76–81.
225. MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 211–13 (2015).
226. Greene, supra note 21, at 300.
227. Id. at 305.
228. See D. James Greiner et al., Self-Help, Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119,
1123 (2017).
ING
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an attorney.229 Michael Sousa has proposed that petition preparers be allowed to give limited legal advice and accompany debtors to § 341 meetings in simple, no asset cases.230
Although Proposal A suffers from the need for legislative action, Proposal B may be relatively easily achievable. Proposal B
may be less controversial than other legislative proposals, given
the relatively low amounts of debt at issue. Again, these proposals are by no means sufficient to address the needs of the impoverished and over-indebted, but they may ameliorate the burden for some—specifically, they can alleviate situations in which
a poor individual’s debt burden is contributing substantially to
her inability to meet basic needs.
In addition to being potentially achievable, my proposal
(whether ultimately achieved via Proposal A or Proposal B) provides an avenue to arrive somewhat closer to meeting the basic
needs of impoverished debtors. Again, this proposal alone will
not be sufficient to guarantee that the basic needs of debtors are
met. It can, however, ameliorate the burden for some over-indebted individuals.
This proposal should also be able to withstand creditors’ objections. Impoverished debtors will be getting no more relief than
they are presently entitled; however, rather than being merely
legally and theoretically available, the relief will actually be
available to these debtors. There is no justification for the burdensome procedures currently in place when applied to the poorest debtors; and certainly not when relatively small amounts of
debt are at issue. Pro se debtors currently face all but insurmountable obstacles to relief,231 and the poorest debtors are precisely those for whom these obstacles create the greatest injustice.
Because relatively small amounts of debts are being discharged, creditors should be less concerned that a speedy process
will be economically detrimental. These are no asset cases and
these creditors would not be paid in a chapter 7 in any event; to
the extent that they receive more payments under the existing
system than a fast-track system, it is due to delays in filing from
the expense and complexity of post-BAPCPA bankruptcy filings.232 Finally, even if the proposal does affect creditor recovery,
229. See Foohey et al., supra note 197, at 1103.
230. See Sousa, supra note 193, at 275–276, 311.
231. See Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Examination of Access to Chapter 7
Relief by Pro Se Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 5, 30 (2009).
232. See Mann, supra note 169, at 379.
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creditors are far more able to bear this cost than impoverished
debtors.
In addition to not causing severe losses to creditors, this proposal also does not require the creation of any new agency or
system. Existing judges, lawyers, courtrooms, and clerks will
process these petitions in the same way that they currently process chapter 7 petitions. The only difference will be that the petitions can be processed much more quickly and with fewer procedures and hearings. If a judge or trustee has any concerns with
a petition, a hearing can be held and the case can proceed pursuant to existing chapter 7 protocols if necessary. This simplified
process will reduce the burden on bankruptcy courts233 and will
make it possible for judges and trustees to devote time to more
complicated cases. This could help maximize recovery for creditors and help ensure cleaner fresh starts for debtors. In addition,
this alleviates the costs and burdens on chapter 7 trustees; in no
asset cases trustees still have to perform substantial work, but
cannot be paid out of the estate. The fast-track proposal eliminates the 341 meeting and the need for extensive review of
debtor documents. Of course, attorneys, petition-preparers, trustees, and judges would need to be trained and familiarized with
the fast-track process. It is also necessary to address the risk
that attorneys would charge their regular rate to assist with the
fast-track process;234 this could be addressed by capping the
amount that attorneys or petition preparers may charge to assist
with the fast-track process.
Because this process is so simple, non-profits and lawyers
donating pro bono services will be able to help more individuals.
Pro se qualifying debtors should be able to navigate this simplified filing successfully and should be able to obtain a discharge.
The creators of the Financial Distress Research Project, Dalié
Jiménez, Jim Greiner, and Lois Lupica, have spent the past

233. See Pardo, supra note 231, at 6.
234. See, e.g., Adam D. Herring, Problematic Consumer Debtor Attorneys’
Fee Arrangements and the Illusion of “Access to Justice,” 37 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 32, 32 (2018) (“[A]ttorneys, law firms and third parties have recently sought
to creatively reimagine the terms and methods of payment for representation of
consumer chapter 7 debtors. Some of these alternative arrangements could run
afoul of bankruptcy law and ethical obligations.”).
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seven years studying what materials help individuals in financial distress.235 As part of this project, they created self-help materials aimed at these individuals.236 For example, UpSolve, a
non-profit start-up launched this summer, plans to use these
materials to help make bankruptcy “simple, fast, and free.”237 A
special petition option would further facilitate access for eligible
debtors. This organization and similar non-profits will serve a
vital role by helping poor debtors with large debt loads access
bankruptcy.
Not only can this proposal help poor debtors seriously burdening creditors or the court system, the proposal also has the
potential to benefit the broader economy. If individuals must devote all of their disposable income to servicing debt, they are not
able to contribute to the economy by purchasing goods and services. Current policies that keep debtors trapped in debt are not
just costly to the debtor, who sacrifices a minimal standard of
living,238 but are also costly to the economy overall.
Finally, the proposal is a step toward satisfying human
rights concerns. Because the United States has chosen not to implement a robust safety net, impoverished individuals are at risk
of inadequate housing, insufficient food and water, lack of
healthcare, and an inability to secure a minimal standard of living sufficient for human dignity.239 In addition, indebted individuals’ human rights are at risk because they may be incarcerated
as a result of being unable to pay a debt, or they may end up
essentially laboring exclusively for the benefit of their creditors.240 Atkinson is right that the access to credit alone is incapable of meeting impoverished debtors’ needs; however, the lack
of social safety net forces debtors to turn to credit, particularly

235. Dalié Jiménez, Can a Nonprofit Startup Fix the Pro Se Problem in
Bankruptcy?, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.creditslips.org/
creditslips/2016/08/can-a-startup-fix-the-pro-se-problem-in-bankruptcy.html.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See Pamela Foohey et al., Life in the Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
219, 242–44 (2018).
239. See generally, Ondersma, supra note 146, at 377 (“Situations of severe
overindebtedness can render debtors unable to meet their basic needs, interfering with a debtor’s ability to access an adequate standard of living or
healthcare.”); Ondersma, supra note 89, at 272 (“Individuals carrying heavy
debt burdens often experience shame, marginalization, exclusion, and the inability to meet their basic needs.”).
240. See Ondersma, supra note 89, at 295–319 (analyzing the human rights
that may be at risk for indebted individuals).

2248

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2211

in emergency situations.241 So long as debtors are forced to rely
on credit to meet basic needs, it is essential that they have an
accessible path to effective debt relief.242
III. RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
This section responds to four potential objections: (1) the
risk that some debtors with assets or with incomes above the
poverty line will receive discharges, (2) the moral hazard risk;
i.e., the risk that debtors will incur debt with the intention of
discharging it, (3) the objection that such a proposal should be
administrative rather than via the bankruptcy courts, and (4)
the risk of adverse consequences to borrowers.
A. THE RISK OF HIGH INCOME, HIGH ASSET DEBTORS
ACCESSING THIS SYSTEM IS MINIMAL
Allowing admission to this debt relief by affidavit, under
penalty of perjury, and without submission of tax returns and
pay stubs may allow some ineligible debtors to receive discharges, but this risk is minimal. First, any judge or trustee can
request additional proof of income for any case.243 Lying to the
bankruptcy court is criminalized under 18 U.S.C. § 157, so a
debtor who is not forthcoming and is then audited risks criminal
charges.244 Second, high-income debtors have little to gain from
accessing this minimal discharge. High-income debtors can cope
with $5000 in debt, and the benefit of the discharge of this relatively small amount of debt would not outweigh the stigma associated with filing or the hit to the debtor’s credit score. If their
debt becomes unmanageable they can access bankruptcy
through the regular bankruptcy system, which provides greater
relief. For these debtors, the fees and complexities of bankruptcy
do not pose an insurmountable barrier, as high-income debtors
can hire attorneys who can help them access the full panoply of
bankruptcy relief. The ability to obtain relief from serious indebtedness is an extremely valuable safety net, and it would

241. See Atkinson, supra note 12, at 70–71; Ondersma, supra note 89, at
339–41.
242. See Ondersma, supra note 89, at 339–41.
243. See 18 U.S.C. § 152(9) (2012) (noting that trustees and officers of the
court are entitled to information relating to the property or financial affairs of
debtors).
244. Id. § 157; see also id. § 152 (providing criminal penalties for debtors who
make false oaths or accounts to the trustee or bankruptcy court).
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make little sense for debtors with reasonable incomes to seek relief from relatively small amounts of debt and risk relinquishing
this privilege. The current bankruptcy system benefits high-income debtors in many ways—permitting unlimited deductions
from the means test for secured debt such as home mortgages
and cars, permitting unlimited homestead exemptions, and excepting spendthrift trusts from property of the estate.245 If the
concern is high income or high asset debtors obtaining discharges, the focus of reform should be on these matters—not
maintaining complexity. Of course, as Ronald Mann has argued,
the amendments thus far to the Code were not, in fact, designed
to create barriers to wealthy, high-income debtors, but were instead designed to keep low-income consumer debtors trapped in
debt repayment as long as possible.246 But to the extent that an
objection based on the risk of high-income, high-asset debtors accessing the system is a sincere one, limiting exemptions and allowing creditors to access spendthrift trusts would have more
impact than keeping the existing barriers to filing, which fall
primarily on those unable to afford counsel.
B. THERE IS LITTLE MORAL HAZARD RISK
This proposal should not increase moral hazard, as it does
not expand available bankruptcy relief. Again, the proposal is
designed to make it at least as easy for the poor to access bankruptcy as it was prior to BAPCPA—BAPCPA’s purported goal
was to prevent high income, “strategic” debtors from filing,247
245. See, e.g., Baran Bulkat, What Expenses Can Help You Pass the Bankruptcy Means Test?, ALLLAW, https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/bankruptcy/
expenses-help-pass-means-test.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2019) (noting that
mortgages, car loans, and other secured loans can help individuals pass the
means test).
246. Mann, supra note 169, at 378–79.
247. 151 CONG. REC. 2993–94 (2005) (statement of Sen. Frist) (asserting that
people plan their bankruptcies strategically); 145 CONG. REC. 8515–16 (1999)
(statement of Rep. Roukema, Chairwoman, H. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts.) (arguing that bankruptcy was becoming a “first stop financial planning tool rather
than a last resort”); 144 CONG. REC. 24936–37 (1998) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“Under the current system, some irresponsible people filing for bankruptcy run up their credit card debt immediately prior to filing knowing that
their debts will soon be wiped away.”); 144 CONG. REC. 21643–44 (1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The fact is that some people use bankruptcy as a convenient financial planning tool to skip out on debts they could repay.”); 144
CONG. REC. 19876–77 (1998) (written remarks of former Sen. Bentsen) (“With
growing frequency, bankruptcy is being treated as a first choice rather than a
last resort, a matter of convenience rather than necessity.”); see also Robert M.
Lawless et al., Interpreting Data: A Reply to Professor Pardo, 83 AM. BANKR.
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and my proposal only applies to debtors with incomes below the
poverty line. It should not be controversial to remove these barriers with respect to these impoverished debtors. As with any
bankruptcy filing, discharge can be denied if there is truly fraud
or abuse.248 Courts can also deny debtors access to bankruptcy
filing “for cause.”249 Finally, once debtors file, they could not file
again for eight years.250 Because this is not relief that is available unlimitedly, debtors in poverty would likely reserve this option for true emergencies.
C. AN ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION WOULD LIKELY BE
INEFFECTIVE AND INEFFICIENT
Some have proposed an administrative solution to filings for
low-income, low-asset cases.251 However, experience with other
administrative systems designed to provide relief to the poor
suggests that an administrative solution is unlikely to be efficient or easy to navigate.252 Systems for obtaining welfare benefits, social security disability benefits, and veterans benefits are
notoriously complex, and applicants are frequently denied relief
due to technical deficiencies or other procedural barriers.253
The United Kingdom offers a special process for debtors
with little disposable income who owe less than 20,000 pounds,
but the process is highly complicated.254 First, there are a number of eligibility restrictions in addition to the debt cap. Applicants must have less than fifty pounds of disposable income per
month, must not be homeowners, and must not own a car worth
more than a thousand pounds.255 In addition, applicants must
disclose any transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value
L.J. 47, 50 (2009).
248. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) (2012).
249. Id. § 707(a).
250. Id. § 727(a)(8); see supra note 211 and accompanying text.
251. Charles M. Foster & Stephen L. Poe, Consumer Bankruptcy: A Proposal
to Reform Chapters 7 and 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 104 DICK. L. REV.
579, 615–16 (2000); Ronald Mann, Making Sense of Nation-Level Bankruptcy
Filing Rates, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 225, 243 (Johanna Niemi et al. eds., 2009);
Mann & Porter, supra note 4, at 338.
252. Littwin, supra note 144, at 1989–2002 (discussing procedural barriers,
inefficiencies, and ineffectiveness in the administrative context of welfare, social security disability programs, and veteran’s benefits).
253. Id.
254. Options for Paying Off Your Debts, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/options
-for-paying-off-your-debts/debt-relief-orders (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
255. Id.
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in the two years prior to filing.256 Debt relief under a Debt Relief
Order is not immediate and not without costs and repercussions.
Debts are not discharged until the Debt Relief Order has been in
place for one year.257 Individuals seeking this debt relief must
apply through a Debt Relief Officer and must pay 90 pounds to
apply.258 Finally, individuals with Debt Relief Orders may not
create, manage, or promote a company without the court’s permission, may not manage a business without disclosing the debt
relief order, and may not act as the director of a company.259
These measures are likely to interfere with impoverished individuals’ full productivity.
D. THE PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT
BORROWERS
There are two related debtor-friendly objections to address.
First, some may worry that the proposal will increase the cost of
credit, or that creditors will limit credit for those below the poverty line. Again, as this proposal is not expanding bankruptcy
relief, there is no reason to think that the cost of credit will increase. If anything, creditors may prefer that debtors access this
system rather than risk discharge of greater debt amounts.
BAPCPA did not cause a reduction in the cost of credit,260 so
there is no reason to think that returning to something approaching the status quo for a subset of debtors would cause an
increase in the cost of credit. Even if there is an increase to cost
of credit, this may be a price worth paying for greater protection
for the individuals and families facing the biggest burdens. Finally, any increase would likely be miniscule—for example, four
states recently enacted restrictions on the conduct of debt collectors, and a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau study indicated that while the cost of credit did increase, the increase was
very small.261
256. INSOLVENCY SERV., INTERMEDIARY GUIDANCE NOTES: DRO2, at 5
(2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/776730/Intermediary_Guidance__Notes_v16.pdf.
257. Options for Paying Off Your Debts, supra note 254.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Michael Simkovic, The Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry
Profits and Prices, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 17 (2009) (noting that BAPCPA actually resulted in an increase in the cost of credit to some consumers).
261. Charles Romeo & Ryan Sandler, The Effect of Debt Collection Laws on
Access to Credit (CFPB Office of Research, Working Paper No. 2018-01, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124954.

2252

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2211

Another potential objection is that debtors may receive a
greater benefit from filing under a traditional chapter 7 that enables discharge of greater amounts of debts. However, this proposal does nothing at all to change or limit that relief; it would
still be available. Debtors needing relief from debt in amounts
that exceed $5000 would file pursuant to existing rules. Of
course, as we have seen, the current system is too onerous for
low-income debtors to successfully obtain relief, and we should
not stop with this proposal. One potential risk is that this
achievement would hinder broader relief. However, BAPCPA
has been around for over a decade now, and although its negative
consequences have been thoroughly documented there does not
seem to be a chance at repeal. If this special petition is successful, perhaps it can be expanded to also apply to impoverished
debtors with greater debt loads who have no assets. In the meantime, the improved self-help materials discussed above may succeed in helping more low-income debtors achieve bankruptcy relief.
CONCLUSION
It is important not to overstate bankruptcy’s capacity to alleviate problems caused by chronic income shortfalls. Improvements to the bankruptcy system can alleviate over-indebtedness,
which can in turn alleviate some of the burdens on the impoverished, but direct efforts to reduce poverty are more critical.262 We
must increase access to affordable housing, healthcare, food, education, and opportunities to improve income. We must also develop a system for providing low-income individuals with access
to genuinely affordable credit. If the only form of credit available
to low-income debtors facing sudden expenses or income shortfalls is extremely expensive, it becomes impossible for them to
dig out. In the meantime, however, there must be a simple and
speedy way for low-income debtors to alleviate unmanageable
debt burdens and avoid debt spirals. This proposal offers a simple and achievable tool that can aid in achieving that end. Although it will not be a complete solution for every impoverished
and over-indebted individual or family, it can make a huge difference for a family that, for example, is making ends meet—
even if barely—and is faced with a sudden expense: a medical
262. See Ware, supra note 2, at 508–09; see also Porter & Thorne, supra note
96, at 117 (explaining how bankruptcy gives low-income debtors a temporary
fix but a debtor’s “stagnant or declining income” prevents any financial improvement).

2019]

SMALL DEBTS, BIG BURDENS

2253

bill, home repair, funeral expense, or car repair. Absent access
to decent and manageable credit terms, they will need to be able
to get out from that debt load before it becomes destabilizing.

